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CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT:  AN 
ARCHITECTURAL SOLUTION TO DIGITALLY 
EXPANDING THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
Evan Hess* 
 
As the internet blossomed into ubiquity, piracy mushroomed with it.  To 
control the threat, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA).  The DMCA created a number of safeguards for copyright 
holders.  But the DMCA purposely ignored whether copyright holders could 
restrict future transfers of their legally purchased work—a concept known 
in physical property as the “first sale doctrine.”  As a result, copyright 
holders began using licenses to control future transfers of their digital 
property. 
This was not the first time copyright holders have attempted to gain 
greater control over their work.  The history of copyright law demonstrates 
a pattern of struggle between competing interests—with public access to 
creative works on one side and the need for incentive to create on the other 
side.  Over time, courts and legislators have chosen different responses to 
this struggle.  Each has encountered varying levels of success.  But all have 
dealt exclusively in physical property. 
The world of physical property is different from that of digital property 
for two reasons.  In the physical world, it is difficult and costly to duplicate 
works, and over time, these works degrade.  By contrast, in the digital 
world, copying a book, a song, or a movie requires only a couple of 
keystrokes and a mouse click.  Additionally, copying a digital file does not 
affect its quality.  In light of these differences, scholars have offered a 
number of solutions, focusing on the difference in copying difficulty 
between physical and digital property.  This Note examines the history of 
copyright law to understand the various solutions available to lawmakers 
when dealing with the threat of piracy and considers the possibility of a 
solution focusing instead on the degradation difference between physical 
and digital property. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is easy to identify tangible property’s digital counterparts.  For 
example, a paperback novel transforms into an e-book and a phonorecord 
becomes an MP3 file.  But simply because these digital counterparts fulfill 
the same role as their tangible ancestors does not mean that they share all of 
their physical predecessors’ characteristics.  The differences between digital 
property and its physical antecedents become clear when one considers the 
two types of property through business and legal lenses.  One example can 
be found in the rental-by-mail and online streaming media company 
Netflix. 
On September 18, 2011, Netflix CEO Reed Hastings followed an 
unpopular price change for his company with a blog post apologizing to his 
customers.1  During this apology, Hastings announced a company split.2  
The Netflix name would be used solely for streaming movies over the 
internet, while the DVD-by-mail service that had made Netflix a household 
name would be renamed “Qwikster.”3  Netflix and Qwikster would operate 
as completely separate entities.4  As soon as three weeks later, one million 
customers canceled their subscriptions to Netflix,5 and the company’s stock 
price plummeted more than 60 percent.6  As a result, Hastings abandoned 
the idea of Qwikster, and Netflix remained the “one place to go for 
streaming and DVDs.”7 
Many customers expressed outrage at Hastings’ move.8 Journalists 
characterized it as a “corporate debacle[]”9 and drew comparisons to “a list 
 
 1. See Reed Hastings, An Explanation and Some Reflections, NETFLIX (Sept. 18, 2011, 
8:59 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/09/explanation-and-some-reflections.html. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Curt Finch, Netflix Kills Qwikster After 1 Million Subscribers Leave, INC. (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://www.inc.com/tech-blog/netflix-kills-qwikster-after-1-million-subscribers-leave
.html. 
 6. Stu Woo, Under Fire, Netflix Rewinds DVD Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2011, at A1. 
 7. Reed Hastings, DVDs Will Be Staying at Netflix.com, NETFLIX (Oct. 10, 2011, 5:00 
AM), http://blog.netflix.com/2011/10/dvds-will-be-staying-at-netflixcom.html. 
 8. Finch, supra note 5. 
 9. Id. 
 1968 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
of companies with embarrassing flip-flops,” including Coca-Cola Co.’s 
“New Coke.”10  But industry commentators believe the relationship 
between Netflix and its wholesalers (i.e., movie copyright owners) drove 
Hastings’ decision.11 
Movie copyright owners and secondary-market businesses, like Netflix, 
occupy inverse positions when dealing with physical property and with 
digital property.12  Namely, when dealing in physical property, secondary-
market businesses are afforded leverage through the first sale doctrine.13  If 
the copyright owners do not reach a reasonable agreement with secondary-
market businesses, these businesses can purchase the property elsewhere 
and then lend or rent it. 
By contrast, because no first sale doctrine presently exists for digital 
property,14 movie copyright holders retain considerable leverage in 
negotiations over the license agreements reached with secondary-market 
businesses for digital property.15  If secondary-market businesses cannot 
reach a reasonable license agreement with copyright owners, there is no 
legal alternative to lending or renting the property.16  Any Netflix 
subscriber knows that there is an essential difference between the physical 
DVD service and the digital streaming service:  “[t]he DVD section has a 
better selection, with newer releases.”17 
This imbalance and its effects are not limited to the film industry.  Other 
online streaming media services have suffered from the current digital 
property regime.  Pandora, a streaming music service, has never turned a 
profit—reporting losses exceeding $105 million for the five fiscal years 
between February 2007 and January 2012.18  Additionally, “Spotify is 
likely to report a loss [in 2012] . . . .  Last year, the company lost about $60 
million.”19  And on April 11, 2012, the U.S. Department of Justice “accused 
 
 10. Woo, supra note 6. 
 11. See Nick Wingfield & Brian Stelter, A Juggernaut Stumbles, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2011, at B1; Henry Blodget, With All Due Respect to Reed Hastings, the Netflix-Qwikster 
Split Sucks for Customers, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 19, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider
.com/2011-09-19/tech/30174644_1_reed-hastings-netflix-ceo-netflix-competitors; Eliot Van 
Buskirk, Netflix-Qwikster Split: It’s the Licensing, Silly, WIRED (Sept. 20, 2011, 2:02 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/business/2011/09/netflix-qwikster-split-licensing/.  
 12. See Buskirk, supra note 11. 
 13. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 14. See infra notes 323–42 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Buskirk, supra note 11. 
 16. See Blodget, supra note 11 (explaining that “[t]o rent a DVD, Netflix need merely 
buy it . . . .  To stream a show or movie, meanwhile, Netflix has to pay a direct licensing 
fee.” (emphasis added)). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Mark Rogowsky, Pandora Finds Little Profit in Reinventing Radio, FORBES (Sept. 
10, 2012, 4:27 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/2012/09/10/pandora-finds-
little-profit-in-reinventing-radio/. 
 19. Evelyn M. Rusli & Michael J. De La Merced, Spotify’s Financing Is Said To Lift 
Value to $4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/05/17/spotify-is-raising-millions-in-a-deal-that-would-value-it-at-4-billion/. 
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Apple, Inc. and five of the nation’s largest publishers . . . of conspiring to 
raise e-book prices . . . . [to] ensure that e-books are profitable.”20 
The only analogous online streaming media service to report 
profitability, Hulu, is a joint venture of ABC, Fox, and NBC.21  Hulu’s 
contracts with network providers are unique because Hulu does not pay for 
any of the costs of running advertisements—not even bandwidth costs.22  In 
addition, Hulu is the only online streaming media service to maintain 
advertisements despite user’s payment of a subscription fee.23  Hulu’s 
internet service draws viewers away from TV and to the internet 
undercutting cable, satellite, and telecom providers who are a steady 
revenue stream to television networks to support the cost of producing 
content.24  As a result, other content copyright holders like Viacom 
removed The Daily Show and The Colbert Report from Hulu because 
having this new content available on Hulu steered customers away from 
Viacom’s Comedy Central website, reducing Viacom’s possible direct 
advertisement revenue.25  These actions lead to questions regarding Hulu’s 
continued profitability.26 
In addition to the effects on online streaming media outlets themselves, 
the lack of a digital analogue to the first sale doctrine has had startling 
effects on the private users of these outlets.  In July 2009, Amazon 
unexpectedly deleted digital versions of George Orwell’s 1984 and Animal 
Farm that customers had previously purchased.27  Reports suggested that 
this deletion followed earlier removal of digital versions of Harry Potter 
books and Ayn Rand novels.28  More recently, Barnes & Noble reportedly 
denied a customer access to a purchased digital book purportedly because 
 
 20. Thomas Catan, Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg & Chad Bray, U.S. Alleges E-book Scheme, 
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2012, 10:58 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230
4444604577337573054615152.html. 
 21. Brian Stelter, Is Hulu Boxed In?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, at BU1. 
 22. Erik Sherman, Hulu Makes a Profit.  Video Content Owners?  Not So Much, 
CBSNEWS (Apr. 2, 2010, 12:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-505124_162-43443210
/hulu-makes-a-profit-video-content-owners-not-so-much/. 
 23. Compare Why Are There Ads in Hulu Plus?, HULU, http://www.hulu.com/support/
article/20356372 (last visited Feb. 15, 2013), with Pandora One, PANDORA, http://
www.pandora.com/one (last visited Feb. 15, 2013) (“Pandora One is completely free of any 
sort of advertising.”), Spotify Premium, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/ (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (“No ads & no commitment.”), and Ads and Pop-ups When Streaming to 
Your PC or Mac, NETFLIX, http://support.netflix.com/en/node/1891#gsc.tab=0 (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2013) (“Netflix does not push advertisements to members using our service.”). 
 24. See Brian Stelter and Brad Stone, Successes (and Some Growing Pains) at Hulu, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B1. 
 25. Sherman, supra note 22. 
 26. See id. 
 27. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Two Classics from Kindle.  (One Is ‘1984.’), N.Y. 
TIMES, July 18, 2009, at B1. 
 28. See id. 
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the credit card the customer purchased the digital book with had expired 
long after the purchase.29 
These instances of copyright owners’ attempts to control their works 
after distribution are not new.  In 1908, the U.S. Supreme Court faced a 
similar problem in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.30  This Note looks to that 
decision, its reasoning, and the realities that surrounded it for guidance in 
restoring the balance between the copyright holders, the secondary market, 
and end users.  By focusing on an element present in the physical-property 
marketplace, degradation, this Note argues that the balance between 
copyright holders, the secondary market, and end users may be restored.  
Part I of this Note provides background information on the origin of 
copyright law, the first sale doctrine, and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act31 (DMCA). Next, Part II explores previous scholarship regarding the 
first sale doctrine in digital property, proposed solutions, and where 
available, the governmental response to these proposals.  Finally, Part III 
offers the opportunity to introduce degradation into digital property to 
reestablish a balance between copyright holders and the secondary market. 
I.  COPYRIGHT’S FOUNDATION AND ITS SUPPORTING POLICIES 
The Founders so valued the production of creative works that they 
provided for their protection in the Constitution:  “The Congress shall have 
Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”32 The importance of copyright 
protection persisted, as the first Congress enacted a copyright statute in 
1790,33 and copyright protection by federal statute remains in force today.34  
Many scholars interpret the Founders’ desire “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts” to be a balancing test.35  The public’s interest in 
 
 29. See Laura Northrup, Here’s Why Digital Rights Management Is Stupid and Anti-
consumer, CONSUMERIST (Nov. 26, 2012), http://consumerist.com/2012/11/26/heres-why-
digital-rights-management-is-stupid-and-anti-consumer/. 
 30. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 33. See Maurice J. Holland, A Brief History of American Copyright Law, in THE 
COPYRIGHT DILEMMA 3, 11 (Herbert S. White ed., 1978); see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 
15, 1 Stat. 124 . 
 34. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 35. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in 
Books, Photocopies, and Computer Systems, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 281 (1970) (“Macaulay’s 
statement that copyright was ‘a tax on readers for the purpose of giving a bounty to writers’ 
reveals the conflict of interest between the reader and the book producer that underlies much 
of the discussion about copyright law.” (footnote omitted)); Gerald Dworkin, Copyright, the 
Public Interest and Freedom of Speech:  A U.K. Copyright Lawyer’s Perspective, in 
COPYRIGHT AND FREE SPEECH:  COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL ANALYSES ¶ 7.03, at 154 
(Jonathan Griffiths & Uma Suthersanen eds., 2005) (“Copyright and the public interest are 
inextricably linked.  All copyright systems seek to strike an appropriate balance between the 
rights of the copyright owner and the public interest.”); William M. Landes and Richard A. 
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ready access to information and art rests on one side,36 on the other rests the 
need to incentivize creators.37 
The first sale doctrine is a thumb on the scale in favor of access in this 
balancing test between public access and control for creator incentive.  The 
current form of the first sale doctrine provides that “the owner of a 
particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under [the Copyright Act], or 
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of 
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that 
copy or phonorecord.”38  The first sale doctrine became law in Bobbs-
Merrill Co., a 1908 Supreme Court decision.  The following year, as part of 
a larger overhaul of the Copyright Act, Congress codified the first sale 
doctrine.39  Since that time, scholars have come to view the first sale 
doctrine as important to promoting policies embraced by copyright law 
more generally.40  Part I.A examines these policies and their rationales to 
frame an analysis of the repeating struggle between public access and 
control for creator incentive in copyright history and to understand why 
public access usually wins.  Part I.B reviews the history of this struggle and 
the results of choosing law or legislation in favor of one side over the other.  
Part I.C discusses the digital revolution, the governmental response—
particularly through the DMCA—and how the DMCA’s “wait and see” 
approach has currently shifted the balance from public access toward 
control for creator incentive. 
A.  The Policies Supporting the First Sale Doctrine 
Scholars have identified at least six policies that the first sale doctrine 
promotes:  (1) access, (2) preservation, (3) privacy, (4) transactional clarity, 
(5) innovation, and (6) platform competition.41  Access is discussed first 
because it provides the basis for the remaining policies.  Without providing 
access, these other important policies would be difficult to achieve. 
 
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 325, 326 (1989) 
(“Copyright protection . . . trades off the costs of limiting access to a work against the 
benefits of providing incentives to create the work in the first place.  Striking the correct 
balance between access and incentives is the central problem in copyright law.”). 
 36. See Dworkin, supra note 35, ¶ 7.03, at 154; Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 326. 
 37. See Dworkin, supra note 35, ¶ 7.03, at 154; Landes & Posner, supra note 35, at 326. 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). 
 39. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (codified as amended at 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a)). 
 40. See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889, 
894–901 (2011); see also, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies:  Copyright Law and 
the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1245, 1310–38 (2001); R. 
Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577, 
585–610 (2003); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 917–
24 (2008). 
 41. See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 894–901; see also Liu, supra 
note 40, at 1310–38; Reese, supra note 40, at 585–610; Van Houweling, supra note 40, at 
917–24. 
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1.  Access 
The first sale doctrine improves access to property in two ways:  
affordability and availability.42  The restriction on copyright owners’ rights 
after the initial sale enables retail competition, secondary markets, rental 
markets, and public lending, which help make copyrighted materials far 
more affordable to consumers.43 
The first sale doctrine generates retail competition because once a 
copyright holder sells copies of his work to a retailer, the retailer can legally 
resell the copies to the public at any price it chooses.44  As a result, the 
public benefits from competition between retailers.45  The Court addressed 
this exact situation in Bobbs-Merrill Co.46 
In addition, the first sale doctrine allows privately owned copies to be 
resold on the secondary market.47  The secondary market increases 
affordability because these copies are often used and usually sell at a lower 
price compared to new copies.48  For some consumers, this opportunity to 
resell also encourages purchases of new copies because subsequent resale 
results in a lower net cost.49 
Next, the first sale doctrine makes copyrighted material more affordable 
by creating a rental market.  The rental of copies provides access for 
individuals who cannot afford or are unwilling to pay the price of acquiring 
ownership.50  Although the rental market for copyrighted works today is 
primarily limited to motion pictures as a result of rental amendments to the 
current Copyright Act,51 rental markets have existed in the past when the 
 
 42. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 894. 
 43. See Reese, supra note 40, at 585–92. 
 44. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 350 (1908) (“In our view the 
copyright statutes, . . . do not create the right to impose, by notice, . . . a limitation at which 
the book shall be sold at retail by future purchasers . . . .”). 
 45. See Reese, supra note 40, at 585 (“More efficient retailers, with lower overhead 
costs, may be able to sell copies at a lower mark-up than less efficient retailers or retailers 
who wish to maintain a higher price-point for marketing reasons.”). 
 46. See infra notes 207–14 and accompanying text. 
 47. See John A. Rothchild, The Incredible Shrinking First-Sale Rule:  Are Software 
Resale Limits Lawful?, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 79 (2004); see also Perzanowski & Schultz, 
supra note 40, at 894 (discussing used bookstores and online auction sites specifically). 
 48. See, e.g., Ed Christman, As Used-CD Biz Grows, Chains Get in on Act, BILLBOARD, 
July 10, 1999, at 1, 92 (noting that used CDs sell at prices between $5.99 and $8.99 
compared to $17.98 “for a catalog CD”); Erik Gruenwedel, Blockbuster Testing New, Used 
DVD Sales on Web, HOME MEDIA MAG., May 27–June 2, 2007, at 1 (noting that used DVDs 
sell at prices between $4.99 and $9.99 compared to new DVDs costing between $16.99 and 
$21.99).  
 49. See Ed Christman, Both Retailer, Label Claims Backed by Used-CD Survey, 
BILLBOARD, Oct. 2, 1993, at 4, 112 (discussing a National Association of Recording 
Merchandisers study that showed 24.6 percent of respondents said the potential for resale 
factored into their purchase, but 41.4 percent said it did not). 
 50. See Reese, supra note 40, at 587–88. 
 51. See infra notes 231–42, 287–92 and accompanying text. 
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means of copying were more difficult than in the recorded music and 
computer software fields.52 
Finally, the first sale doctrine reduces the cost of copyrighted works by 
making copies available through public lending libraries.53  Public lending 
is the epitome of affordability because the public gains access to the copy 
often without a direct charge.54  However, the individual does incur 
nonmonetary costs.  These nonmonetary costs include:  waiting for the 
library to obtain a copy, waiting her turn to borrow the copy if the library 
lends the copy to someone else first, returning the copy after a specified 
period of time at the risk of incurring fines, and possessing the copy subject 
to the library’s recall.55  These nonmonetary costs thus sacrifice availability 
for affordability.56 
In addition to affordability, the first sale doctrine ensures the availability 
of copyrighted works.57  Copyrighted works may become unavailable for 
several reasons.  For example, copyright owners may allow the work to go 
out of print because it is not economically viable to continue to produce 
copies.58  Of the 187,280 books published in the United States between 
1927 and 1946, only 4,267 remain in print today.59  This means that over 97 
percent of the copyrighted works published during that time lie 
commercially dormant and inaccessible.60  Similarly, of the 157,068 titles 
listed in the Turner Classic Movies’ database, fewer than 4 percent are 
available on home video.61  Simply because the demand for a work is 
 
 52. See, e.g., CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES 95 (1999) 
(observing that, in response to demand, booksellers began renting books and that these 
circulating libraries survived from sometime before 1814 and well into the 1950s); see also 
CHARLES KNIGHT, THE OLD PRINTER AND THE MODERN PRESS 229–36 (1854) (discussing the 
effect of the circulating library on public literacy and the availability of books). 
 53. See Robert M. Glushko, The Future of Copyright, INFO. OUTLOOK, Oct. 1, 2010, at 
14, 15 (“[T]he first sale doctrine is the current cornerstone of library lending.”). 
 54. See Reese, supra note 40, at 588.  Of course, many library users pay for the library 
through a tuition charge or taxes. See id. at 589.  Still others may pay a membership fee or 
borrowing charge. See id. 
 55. See COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO. 
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA:  INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 101 n.13 (2000); see also Reese, supra note 40, at 588 
n.42. 
 56. See Reese, supra note 40, at 589. 
 57. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 895; Reese, supra note 43, at 592. 
 58. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 112–13 (2004) (describing creative property 
as experiencing “different lives” and observing that books go out of print very quickly). 
 59. See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Jason M. Schultz, Neglecting the National Memory:  
How Copyright Term Extensions Compromise the Development of Digital Archives, 4 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 451, 472 (2002). 
 60. See id. 
 61. See Anthony Kaufman, The Vanishing:  The Demise of VHS, and the Movies 
Disappearing Along With It, MUSEUM MOVING IMAGE (Feb. 26, 2009), http://
www.movingimagesource.us/articles/the-vanishing-20090226. 
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insufficient to make it economically viable to produce copies does not mean 
that the demand is nonexistent, or even negligible.62 
Moreover, copyright owners may wish to suppress their work because 
their views on it have changed.63  For example, on his deathbed, Virgil 
asked that The Aeneid be burned.64  More recently, film director Tony Kaye 
attempted to thwart the success of his film American History X.65  
Additionally, successors in copyright may have different views from the 
original copyright owner and may wish to remove the work from public 
access.66 
Also, copyright owners sometimes purposely withdraw their work from 
the marketplace temporarily in order to generate demand.67  One well-
known example of a company who employs this marketing strategy is Walt 
Disney, Co.68  The company routinely limits the availability of its animated 
films for viewing in theatres and purchase on videocassette and DVD by 
withdrawing them from the market for a number of years.69  This builds 
demand for the movie by making its availability artificially scarce.70 
In each of these cases, the first sale doctrine provides an individual who 
wants to access a work that the copyright holder wishes to suppress with the 
opportunity to purchase a used copy on the secondary market, rent a copy 
on the rental market, or borrow a copy through public lending.71 
2.  Preservation 
Statistically speaking, a work has a better chance of surviving over time 
if more copies of that work exist.72  One reason is that different copy 
owners will treat their copies differently.73  One “dramatic example of the 
 
 62. See, e.g., Motoko Rich, Publisher and Authors Parse a Term:  Out of Print, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2007, at C3 (discussing Paula Fox, an author of six out-of-print novels who 
revived her career after a Harper’s Magazine article cited her work). 
 63. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595. 
 64. See THE VIRGILIAN TRADITION:  THE FIRST FIFTEEN HUNDRED YEARS 420–25 (Jan 
Ziolkowski & Michael C.J. Putnam eds., 2008). 
 65. See Benjamin Svetkey, X Marks the Spat, ENT. WKLY., Oct. 23, 1998, at 28, 33–36 
(discussing Kaye’s attempt to pull the film from the Toronto film festival and running 
advertisements negatively portraying the film). 
 66. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595 (explaining that James Boswell’s son believed that 
Boswell’s Life of Johnson portrayed his father in a bad light and would have suppressed the 
work if he succeeded in copyright ownership). 
 67. See id. at 602. 
 68. See Eric Felten, Disney’s Movie Vault:  Scarily Creating a Fantasia of Scarcity, 
WALL ST. J. (May 20, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870490460457
6333344180431886.html (describing Disney’s “longstanding practice” of taking its films off 
the market). 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. (suggesting that Disney’s “dreaded vault isn’t so much about creating 
excitement as it is about creating fear”). 
 71. See Reese, supra note 40, at 595. 
 72. See id. at 605. 
 73. See id. at 606. 
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preservation impact of diversely situated copy holders” can be seen in old 
movie reels.74 
In the 1920s, movie reels were often shown in a distribution chain from 
one town to the next.75  This distribution chain ended in Dawson City, in 
Canada’s Yukon Territory.76  Motion picture copyright owners often 
retained the rights to the reels and asked for their return at the end of the 
distribution period.77  To save the expense of returning the reels, 
distributors left the prints in the Canadian Bank of Commerce’s custody.78  
By 1929, around five hundred films accumulated in Dawson City.79  These 
reels were later used to fill in a swimming pool to convert it into an ice 
rink.80  In 1978, a building project excavation uncovered the reels, which 
had remained in surprisingly good condition due to the frigid temperatures 
of the Yukon.81  Although these were not the only copies of the reels 
initially distributed, those other copies were lost, destroyed, or 
deteriorated.82  As a result of Dawson City’s unique conditions, however, 
portions of some motion pictures that otherwise do not exist, remain 
viewable today.83 
The ability to alienate a copy from one’s possession under the first sale 
doctrine is important to preservation because it results in wider distribution 
and dissemination.84  Presumably, without the first sale doctrine, the 
consumer who moves locations, runs out of storage room, or simply wants 
to get rid of her copy would discard it if she could not sell or give the used 
copy to another owner.85  Thus, a work that may otherwise disappear 
remains accessible to the public. 
3.  Privacy 
The first sale doctrine permits copy owners to transfer their copies 
without the permission of the copyright holder.86  This independence fosters 
privacy and anonymity.87  Because copyrighted works can be controversial 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Sam Kula, Rescued from the Permafrost:  The Dawson Collection of Motion 
Pictures, 8 ARCHIVARIA 141, 142 (1979). 
 77. See Reese, supra note 40, at 606.  This, of course, takes the film reels out of the first 
sale doctrine.  However, the example serves as one of the successes of distribution in copies 
for preservation.  This is an aspect that the first sale doctrine supports in its normal 
operation. 
 78. See Kula, supra note 76, at 142. 
 79. See id. at 144. 
 80. See id. at 142. 
 81. See id. at 143. 
 82. See Reese, supra note 40, at 607. 
 83. See Kula, supra note 76, at 146. 
 84. See Reese, supra note 40, 607. 
 85. See id. at 607–08. 
 86. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896. 
 87. See id. 
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or stigmatized, lack of anonymity in distribution could chill the activity.88  
An individual may not wish to be affiliated with the authors or subject 
matter that she chooses to purchase, although that individual may have 
valid reasons for purchasing the work.89  The first sale doctrine encourages 
distribution and free expression by permitting anonymous transfer without 
the copyright holder’s permission.90 
4.  Transactional Clarity 
The first sale doctrine also clarifies a purchaser’s rights, resulting in 
market efficiency.91  The law recognizes only a limited number of property 
rights because limitless variety raises transaction and information costs.92  
For example, if the Copyright Act permitted copyright owners to control 
future sales in a myriad of different ways, including setting certain prices, 
selling to certain types of consumers, alienating only certain portions, 
selling only in or to certain geographic locations, and so on, the consumer 
would be forced to sift through “a fragmented and confusing constellation 
of terms and restrictions” for each transaction in a secondary market.93  
Instead, the first sale doctrine permits the consumer to engage in clear, and 
comparatively simple, transactions.94 
5.  Innovation 
The first sale doctrine also promotes innovation.95  Copyright owners 
must innovate in order to compete with secondary markets.96  For example, 
after a work is circulated for several years, a copyright owner will release 
new editions of material including remastered material, additional content, 
updates, or add-on features.97 
Similarly, forum providers for the secondary market innovate in order to 
compete with one another.98  The possibility of resale encourages the 
 
 88. See Julie E. Cohen, A Right To Read Anonymously:  A Closer Look at “Copyright 
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1010–11 (1996). 
 89. See id. at 1014 (“I may read The Turner Diaries or The Fountainhead for purely 
scholarly reasons, without any intent or desire to associate myself with the movements they 
have come to represent.”). 
 90. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896. 
 91. See id.  
 92. See Van Houweling, supra note 40, at 897–98. 
 93. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896; see also, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:  The Numerus Clausus 
Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 11 (2000) (discussing a similar closed universe in interpreting 
landlord-tenant law where “[l]eases are limited to four recognized types”). 
 94. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 896. 
 95. See Zbigniew J. Bednarz, Unreal Property:  Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. and the Rapid 
Expansion of Copyright Owners’ Rights by Granting Broad Deference to Software License 
Agreements, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 939, 962 (2012) (“[T]he second important public interest 
protected by the first-sale doctrine [is] the promotion of entrepreneurship and innovation.”). 
 96. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 897. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. at 897–98. 
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creation of new business models and technologies.99  Examples of such 
innovation include Amazon, eBay, Netflix, and Redbox.100 
Lastly, the first sale doctrine encourages innovation on the part of the 
copy owner.101  The first sale doctrine allows users to reenvision their 
copies into completely new objects.  Examples include “a handbag made 
from a classic novel, a clock made from old music CDs, or a flashing bike 
light made from an old Nintendo NES video game controller.”102  The first 
sale doctrine also mitigates restrictions on property that are contrary to 
desirable goals that only become apparent at a later date.103  One example is 
the software application Snappli, available for Apple’s iPhone.  Snappli 
compresses data received by the phone to reduce network usage that can 
result in large bills for users without unlimited data plans.104  In order to 
work, Snappli requires users to install the application and a configuration 
profile.105  The configuration profile interrupts the transmission of wireless 
data to a user’s phone so that Snappli’s servers can compress the data.106  
These features “are, in theory, restricted by Apple.”107  However, these 
features are desirable to both wireless network carriers and end users 
because they reduce the use of bandwidth,108 a valuable commodity for 
wireless networks109 and one source of extra charges for smartphone 
users.110  Apple has approved at least two applications using this technique 
 
 99. See Bednarz, supra note 95, at 962 (“A robust secondary market creates 
opportunities for entrepreneurs to create businesses, such as used-book stores, thrift stores, 
and used-record stores, thereby expanding the economy.”). 
 100. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 898. 
 101. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users As Innovators:  Implications for Patent Doctrine, 
79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 495 (2008) (discussing the first sale doctrine in the patent context 
and noting that the related “right to repair a patented device protected and encouraged user 
innovation”). 
 102. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 899 (footnotes omitted). 
 103. See Van Houweling, supra note 40, at 901 (“The problem of [excessive control by 
one party over the freedom and flexibility of the other] is further compounded when a 
servitude arises in a context of rapid and unpredictable change, making unforeseen 
obsolescence especially likely.”). 
 104. See Rachel Metz, App Shrinks Your Data, Then Your Bill, MIT TECH. REV. (Sept. 18, 
2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429165/app-shrinks-your-data-then-your-
bill/. 
 105. See Rachel Metz, Developers Use a Workaround To Make iPhone Apps Do More, 
MIT TECH. REV. (Oct. 23, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/429651/
developers-use-a-workaround-to-make-iphone-apps-do-more/. 
 106. See id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See Metz, supra note 104. 
 109. See David Goldman, Sorry, America:  Your Wireless Airwaves Are Full, CNN 
MONEY (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:30 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/02/21/technology/spectrum_
crunch/index.htm (“Wireless spectrum—the invisible infrastructure over which all wireless 
transmissions travel—is a finite resource.  When, exactly, we’ll hit the wall is a subject of 
intense debate, but almost everyone in the industry agrees that a crunch is coming.”). 
 110. See Julianne Pepitone, iPhone 5 WiFi Bug Leads to Giant Cellular Data Overages, 
CNN MONEY (Oct. 1, 2012, 5:27 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/10/01/technology/iphone
-5-data-overage/index.html (“Carriers are using carrots and sticks to move customers away 
from unlimited data and toward metered billing plans that cap customers’ data use and 
charge them for overages.”). 
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and allows users to download them in its application marketplace, the App 
Store.111 
6.  Platform Competition 
The first sale doctrine reduces consumer lock-in and, thus, encourages 
platform competition.112  Consumer lock-in results when the costs of 
switching to a new vendor or technology platform are high enough to 
discourage consumers from purchasing an otherwise preferable, competitive 
product.113  Consumer lock-in impedes new market participants who 
develop similar, but better, products.114  Accordingly, consumer lock-in 
creates competitive concerns and detracts from incremental innovation.115  
However, because an individual who wants to switch from Microsoft’s 
Xbox video game system to Sony’s PlayStation system can recover a 
substantial amount of his investment by selling the Xbox in the secondary 
market, the first sale doctrine lowers the consumer lock-in barrier to 
switching.116 
With these policies in mind, this Note next examines the impetus behind 
the creation of copyright law starting first with the introduction of the 
printing press in England in 1476.  Because the digital revolution that began 
four hundred years later follows a very similar path, examining the initial 
fluctuation between open public access and copyright protection is valuable 
to crafting the proper response for digital property. 
B.  The Origin of Copyright Law in the Physical Domain 
In 1476, William Caxton introduced the printing press to England.117  
Along with the ability to produce a large amount of printed material, 
Caxton’s introduction brought a “new trade to be encouraged,”118 the 
“creation of a new form of property,”119 and the potential for piracy.120 
 
 111. See Metz, supra note 105. 
 112. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 900. 
 113. See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 52, at 11 (describing the ability of CDs to 
overcome lock-in, while “[q]uadrophonic sound, stereo AM radio, PicturePhones, and digital 
audiotape did not fare as well”). 
 114. See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 40, at 900. 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20 (1968). 
 118. Id. at 21. 
 119. Id. at 20. 
 120. It appears that Caxton was not a victim of piracy himself, see id. at 21, but at least 
one scholar asserts that “had there been any competitor possessed of sufficient capital to be a 
really formidable pirate,” then there may have been “a very early recognition of an author’s 
rights to the fruits of his brain.” ALFRED W. POLLARD, SHAKESPEARE’S FIGHT WITH THE 
PIRATES AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE TRANSMISSION OF HIS TEXT 1 (1917). 
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1.  The Evolution of Copyright in England:  Finding the Balance Between 
Public Access and Control 
At first, the British government failed to regulate the new trade.121  As 
the trade grew, native printers repeatedly sought to eliminate foreign 
competition,122 sometimes by violence.123  In response, the British 
government passed statutes that included printing and bookselling in their 
protection of domestic trade.124  Throughout this time, the printers 
continued to seek greater control over their trade.125 
In 1557, Queen Mary chartered the Royal Stationers’ Company of 
London.126  This charter granted the printers a monopoly on publishing,127 
permitting the Stationers’ Company to control the book trade and, 
subsequently, to seek even further expansion of that control.128 
However, the Stationers’ Company’s monopoly did not last forever.  In 
1694, the House of Commons allowed the copyright statute, then known as 
the Licensing Act, to lapse.129  Among the House of Commons’ reasons for 
opposing renewal of the Licensing Act was that the Act gave the Stationers’ 
Company the right to impede the printing of all books, including those 
considered “innocent and useful.”130 
Once the Licensing Act expired, however, “piracy sprouted.”131  In 
Scotland, “no centrali[z]ed limitation was placed on the proliferation of 
 
 121. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 21–22 (discussing the exception of printing and 
bookselling from a 1484 statute regulating foreign trade); H.G. Aldis, The Book-Trade, 
1557–1625, in 4 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE 432, 458 (A.W. Ward & A.R. 
Waller eds., 1910) (“In the early days of printing in England, when the native press produced 
but a very small proportion of the books in demand, the foreign printer and stationer were so 
freely tolerated, if not actively encouraged, that a large part of the trade fell into the hands of 
strangers.”). 
 122. See Aldis, supra note 121, at 458. 
 123. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 22 (discussing both the case of Pynson v. Squyer 
involving “murderous attacks” by printers against a “Norman-born printer,” and “the ‘Evil 
May Day’ of 1517, when a mob of two thousand attacked the French and Flemish quarters 
and sacked the houses.”). 
 124. See id. at 22–23 (citing 14 & 15 Hen. 8, c. 2 (1523) (Eng.), 21 Hen. 8, c. 16 (1529) 
(Eng.), and 25 Hen. 8, c. 15 (1533) (Eng.)). 
 125. See id. at 29 (noting that “[a]s early as 1542, the [printers] had requested a charter” 
of incorporation). 
 126. See JOHN GANTZ & JACK B. ROCHESTER, PIRATES OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM:  HOW 
THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS DAMAGE OUR PERSONAL FREEDOMS, OUR JOBS, AND THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 34 (2005); PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 28. 
 127. See GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34; see also PATTERSON, supra note 
117, at 31 (discussing the Stationers’ Company’s “high degree of autonomy in controlling 
the book trade”). 
 128. See CYPRIAN BLAGDEN, THE STATIONERS’ COMPANY:  A HISTORY, 1403–1959, at 40 
(1960); see also PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 38 (noting that this incorporation “marked 
the first round in the continuing struggle of the stationers to enhance their monopoly”). 
 129. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 139. 
 130. See id. (quoting 11 H.C. JOUR. (1695) 305–06 (Eng.)). 
 131. GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34; see also R.R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT:  ITS 
LAW AND ITS LITERATURE 5 (1886) (“With the expiration of [licensing] acts in 1679 
legislative penalties lapsed, and piracy became common. . . .  [After a second lapse in 1694, 
p]iracy again flourished.”); DAVID SAUNDERS, AUTHORSHIP AND COPYRIGHT 53 (1992) (citing 
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presses” and, by comparison to England, copyright was limited.132  As a 
result, Scottish publishers could copy English books and resell them in 
England at a much lower cost.133 
The Stationers’ Company repeatedly, but unsuccessfully, attempted to 
regain control through censorship laws—the government’s original purpose 
in granting the monopoly.134  In 1707, however, the publishers refocused 
attention from censorship laws to their property interest and the incentive to 
continue printing.135 
On December 12, 1709, the bill that became the first copyright statute 
started with a petition similar to the 1707 bill.136  In 1710, the British 
government enacted the Statute of Anne.137  At the time of its passage, the 
sought-after statute represented a victory for the Stationers’ Company.138  
As time went on, however, Professor Feather asserts that the 1710 Act 
proved to be “thoroughly unsatisfactory.”139 
The most notable characteristic of the Statute of Anne is that it placed 
limits on the term of the copyright.140  Shortly after the passage of the 
Statute of Anne, the Stationers’ Company’s behavior demonstrates no 
discernable difference in the law.141  But, by 1731, the copyrights that 
existed before 1710 approached expiration.142  In response, the Stationers’ 
Company sought expansion of the copyright term in Parliament into 
perpetuity.143   
 
a petition before Parliament in 1710 “arguing that in [the Licensing Act’s] absence those 
booksellers who legally buy their copies are ruined by the pirates who do not”); Daniel 
DeFoe, An Essay on the Regulation of the Press (1704), available at http://
www.luminarium.org/renascence-editions/defoe2.html (discussing “a certain sort of 
Thieving which is now in full practice in England, and which no Law extends to punish, viz. 
some Printers and Booksellers printing Copies none of their own”). 
 132. Alastair J. Mann, “A Mongrel of Early Modern Copyright”:  Scotland in European 
Perspective, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY:  ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 51, 55, 57 
(Ronan Deazley, Martin Kretschmer & Lionel Bently eds., 2010). 
 133. GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 34. 
 134. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 140–41. 
 135. See 15 H.C. JOUR. (1707) 313 (Eng.). Facially, confusion exists as to the date of the 
bill’s introduction. Compare JOHN FEATHER, PUBLISHING, PIRACY, AND POLITICS:  AN 
HISTORICAL STUDY OF COPYRIGHT IN BRITAIN 56 (1994) (placing the bill in February 1707), 
with PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 142 (identifying the date as February 26, 1706 (O.S.)).  
This discrepancy arises from British use of the Julian calendar through 1752. See The 1752 
Calendar Change, CONN. ST. LIBR. (Sept. 2008), http://www.cslib.org/CalendarChange.htm. 
Where applicable, this Note attempts to modernize the dates in adherence with the Gregorian 
calendar. 
 136. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 142. 
 137. An Act for the Encouragement of Learning by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books 
in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (Eng.); see GANTZ & 
ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 35. 
 138. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 62. 
 139. See id. at 64. 
 140. See GANTZ & ROCHESTER, supra note 126, at 35. 
 141. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 67–68; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 152. 
 142. See FEATHER, supra note 135, at 68. 
 143. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 154–58. 
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When this failed, the Stationers’ Company turned to the courts.144  The 
Stationers’ Company’s attempt to protect the copyrights expiring under the 
Statute of Anne did not seek an extension of limits, but rather aimed to 
establish a perpetual copyright.145  In order to do so, their “principal 
weapon” was the idea of the common law copyright.146  This idea asserted 
that copyright is, in its essence, the author’s natural right.147 
In 1769, the King’s Bench ruled, in Millar v. Taylor,148 that a common 
law copyright did exist.149  However, Millar did not last long as 
precedent.150  After the decision in Millar, a Scottish bookseller named 
Alexander Donaldson purposely reprinted the same work in dispute in 
Millar.151  In response, the copyright holders brought an action for an 
injunction.152  The House of Lords, in Donaldson v. Beckett,153 held that the 
Statute of Anne destroyed and replaced the author’s common law right to 
the sole printing, publishing, and vending of his works.154  As a result, the 
Donaldson case ended the printers’ claim to perpetual monopoly.155  The 
Donaldson case’s view of copyright as limited in term was the view 
received into the fledgling United States of America just a few years 
later.156 
 
 144. See id. at 158. 
 145. See id. at 153. 
 146. See id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B.). 
 149. Id. at 256–57; see ISABELLA ALEXANDER, COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 30 (2010). 
 150. See ALEXANDER, supra note 149, at 30; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 172 (“Millar 
v. Taylor . . . lasted as a precedent for only five years.”). 
 151. See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY:  THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG 
TO GATES 123 (2009) (referring to Donaldson’s choice as a “calculated decision”); see also 
Donaldson v. Beckett, (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838. 
 152. See JOHNS, supra note 151, at 124. 
 153. (1774) 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L.) 838. 
 154. See 17 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1774) 953, 1003; PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 174 
(“The actual holding of the Donaldson case is that the author’s common-law right to the sole 
printing, publishing, and vending of his works, a right which he could assign in perpetuity, is 
taken away and supplanted by the Statute of Anne.”). 
 155. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 178 (noting that “the Donaldson case was widely 
approved at the time of its rendering, except by the few monopolists whom it affected 
directly” and discussing these monopolists’ plea to Parliament for relief, just six days after 
the decision in Donaldson, “contending that in reliance on the Millar case they had invested 
thousands of pounds in the purchase of old copyrights not protected by statute”); see also 17 
PARL. HIST. ENG. (1774) 1078. 
 156. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 179; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The 
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”). 
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2.  The American Version:  Balancing Public Access and 
Control from the Outset 
The American response to the printing press, like much of American 
jurisprudence, mirrors that of England in many respects.  In 1638, the first 
printing press arrived in Cambridge, Massachusetts.157  Like England, 
authorities in Massachusetts treated the press as requiring supervision and 
suppression.158  However, these authorities also viewed the press as a 
public utility, and this view balanced the need to regulate.159  As a result, 
“[t]hroughout the colonial period . . . the press was seen as an important but 
dangerous public resource to be encouraged and used by the government, 
but also to be restricted and regulated.”160 
On September 5, 1787, during the Constitutional Convention, a 
committee submitted a proposal reflecting this concern of balancing access 
and control:  “To promote the progress of science and the useful arts, by 
securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to 
their respective writings and discoveries.”161  The delegates adopted this 
clause without debate.162 
On May 31, 1790, the First Congress passed the first federal copyright 
act.163  The title of this act again highlights the balance between access and 
control164:  “An Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the 
copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such 
copies, during the times therein mentioned.”165 
In 1834, Wheaton v. Peters,166the first landmark copyright case in the 
United States came before the Supreme Court.167  Henry Wheaton authored 
twelve United States Supreme Court reporters, known as Wheaton’s 
Reports between 1816 and 1827.168  In June 1828, Wheaton’s successor, 
 
 157. See Oren Bracha, Early American Printing Privileges.  The Ambivalent Origins of 
Authors’ Copyright in America, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY, supra note 132, at 89, 91. 
 158. See id. at 92. 
 159. See id. (“The Massachusetts authorities perceived the importance of the press to both 
the authority of civil government and the religious and intellectual mission of the colony’s 
elite. . . .  Alongside its public utility, the press could also be a dangerous catalyst of civil 
and religious dissent and unrest.”). 
 160. See id. at 95–96. 
 161. JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION IN 
THE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA IN 1787, at 510–11 (1845). 
 162. See id. at 512. 
 163. See PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 197; see also Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 
124. 
 164. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 165. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124; see PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 197. 
 166. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). 
 167. BENJAMIN W. RUDD, NOTABLE DATES IN AMERICAN COPYRIGHT, 1783–1969, at 138, 
available at http://www.copyright.gov/history/dates.pdf.  There are only two decisions in 
American jurisprudence pertaining to copyright during the period from 1790 to 1834:  
Nichols v. Ruggles, 3 Day 145 (Conn. 1808), and Ewer v. Coxe, 8 F. Cas. 917 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1824) (No. 4584), each dealing with the technical requirements of the 1790 Act. See 
PATTERSON, supra note 117, at 207 n.15. 
 168. See id. at 593. 
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Richard Peters, circulated a letter proposing to replace the twenty-five 
volumes previously published by Alexander Dallas, William Cranch, and 
Wheaton with six volumes at one-fifth of their cost.169  In May 1831, after 
Peters published his third volume (and the first to contain Wheaton’s 
Reports), Wheaton filed a bill in the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking an injunction and accounting against Peters.170 
In 1834, the case came before the Supreme Court upon the circuit court’s 
dissolution of the injunction and dismissal of the bill.171  Wheaton claimed 
a copyright under both the common law and the Copyright Act.172  Justice 
John McLean, writing for the Court, adopted the position that no common 
law copyright existed in the United States.173  First, the Court observed that 
there was no federal common law.174  Accordingly, any asserted common 
law right must arise from the state in which the controversy originated.175  
For this reason, the Court examined whether the state of Pennsylvania, 
where Wheaton’s Reports was first published, had adopted English 
common law copyright (assuming one existed).176  Despite modern 
evidence to the contrary,177 the Court took the view that English judicial 
history of author’s literary property began in 1760.178  With this date in 
mind, the Court found no common law copyright existed “when the colony 
of Penn was organized”179 and that the controversy over the existence of a 
common law copyright did not arise until “[l]ong afterwards.”180 
The majority found a close parsing of the language used in Article 1, 
Section 8 of the Constitution, and the Copyright Act of 1790 even more 
conclusive.181  The Court rejected the argument that “secure” as used in the 
Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution meant “to preserve,” because the 
founders referred to “securing” a right to both authors and inventors.182  
Based on this phrasing, “secure” must mean a future right because no one 
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 180. See Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 660. 
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ever “pretended . . . in this country or in England, that an inventor has a 
perpetual right, at common law, to sell the thing invented.”183   
Similarly, the Court found that Congress was referring to a future right in 
the Copyright Act of 1790 by its use of the language “shall have the sole 
right and liberty of printing.”184  From this reasoning, the Court concluded 
that in order to secure his right, Wheaton must have strictly complied with 
all of the requirements of the Copyright Act in order to obtain the 
copyright.185  Because the record failed to disclose whether Wheaton 
complied with these requirements, the order to dissolve the injunction was 
vacated and the case was remanded.186   
By holding as it did, the Court incorporated the philosophy espoused in 
Donaldson into American law:  an author’s copyright is a statutory grant of 
monopoly limited in duration “in derogation of the rights of the public.”187  
A limited copyright, however, is important to provide an incentive to create 
and must not always yield to public access.188   
Nearly twenty years after Wheaton, the Court faced a new question:  Are 
copyright and property rights separate?  In Stephens v. Cady189 and Stevens 
v. Gladding,190 the Court answered this question in the affirmative.191  Both 
Cady and Gladding involved the same petitioner and arose from the same 
set of facts.  The petitioner, James Stevens, registered the copyright to a 
map of Rhode Island that he engraved onto a copperplate on April 23, 
1831.192  The defendant in Cady, Isaac Cady, purchased this copperplate for 
$245 under a sale on an execution from a judgment against Stevens.193  The 
defendants in Gladding, Royal Gladding and Isaac T. Proud, sold maps that 
Cady printed from the copperplate.194  Stevens asserted that, by doing so, 
the defendants violated his copyright, which was separate from the property 
right in the copperplate.195 
In Cady, the defendant did not follow the appeal into the Court.196  As a 
result, the Court did not receive any arguments for sustaining the lower 
court’s dismissal of Stevens’s complaint.197  In Gladding, the defendants 
argued that whenever a copyright owner creates a plate that is incapable of 
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 184. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 185. See id. at 667. 
 186. See id. at 667–68. 
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 189. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852). 
 190. 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1854). 
 191. See id. at 453; Cady, 55 U.S. at 532. 
 192. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450; Cady, 55 U.S. at 529. 
 193. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450; Cady, 55 U.S. at 529. 
 194. See Gladding, 58 U.S. at 450. 
 195. See id. 
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beneficial use beyond printing his map, “he thereby annexes to the plate the 
right to use it for printing that map, and also the right to publish and sell the 
copies when printed.”198 
In Cady, Justice Samuel Nelson delivered the opinion of the Court.199  
The Court cited to Millar, observing that copyright includes “an incorporeal 
right to print and publish the map.”200  In essence, the Court reasoned that 
to find that the copyright inhered in the property right “would be saying . . . 
that the exclusive right to make any given work of art necessarily belonged 
to the person who happened to become the owner of the tools with which it 
was made.”201  As a result, the Court reversed the decree below.202 
In Gladding, Justice Benjamin R. Curtis delivered the opinion of the 
Court, adding to the decision in Cady.203  The Court found that selling a 
copperplate transfers the right to lawfully use it “but not the right to a use 
thereof, by reason of the ownership of something else which he has not 
bought, and which belongs to a third person.”204  Because the copyright 
existed distinctly and independently from the property right, by grant from 
the federal government, it is not annexed to the property “either by the act 
of its owner or by operation of law.”205  Therefore, the Court reversed the 
decree of the court below.206 
With copyright and property rights firmly defined as separate, copyright 
owners sought to gain greater control over the copies they produced.  Just 
over fifty years after Cady and Gladding, the Court considered whether a 
copyright permits the holder to restrict resale of the copies she produced. 
In Bobbs-Merrill Co., Bobbs-Merrill Co. owned the copyright for a book 
entitled The Castaway.207  In copies of the book, Bobbs-Merrill printed the 
following notice, immediately below the copyright notice:  “‘The price of 
this book at retail is one dollar net.  No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less 
price, and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright.’”208 
The defendants, Isidor and Nathan Straus, partners at R. H. Macy & Co., 
purchased copies of the book for retail sale.209  Macy’s purchased 90 
percent of the copies at a wholesale price, about 40 percent below retail.210  
Macy’s purchased the remaining 10 percent at full retail price.211  Both the 
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defendants and the wholesale dealers knew that The Castaway was 
copyrighted.212  Nevertheless, Bobbs-Merrill and the wholesale dealers had 
no agreement to restrict the wholesalers’ sales to retailers who would 
observe the terms of the notice.213  As a result, Macy’s sold copies of the 
book for eighty-nine cents each without Bobbs-Merrill’s consent.214 
Bobbs-Merrill asserted that because the Copyright Act vested it with the 
sole right to “vend,” the Copyright Act permitted Bobbs-Merrill to restrict 
future sales.215  Justice William R. Day wrote the opinion for the Court.216  
The Court turned first to precedent, citing Wheaton to confirm that the 
published works’ copyright originated solely from statute.217  Next, the 
Court cited Cady to establish that “the main purpose” of the Copyright Act 
of 1790 and its successive amending statutes was to “secure the author the 
right to multiply copies of his work.”218 
With this historical backdrop in mind, the Court turned to a close parsing 
of the language of the statute, focusing on three sections:  §§ 4952, 4965, 
and 4970.219  The Court determined that the right to vend was of primary 
importance to achieving the statute’s main purpose of securing the sole 
right to multiply copies of the work to the copyright holder.220  However, 
the copyright owner exhausted her right to vend upon completion of the 
first sale.221  Any reading of the statute that extended the right to vend to a 
right to control future sales “extend[ed the statute’s] operation, by 
construction, beyond its meaning.”222  Accordingly, the Court affirmed the 
lower court’s decree dismissing Bobbs-Merrill’s complaint.223 
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
Congress embraced the holding in its 1909 revision of the Copyright Act, 
which provided that “nothing in this Act shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, 
or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of 
which has been lawfully obtained.”224  In fact, through the first seventy-five 
years after its codification, neither Congress nor the courts sought to alter 
the first sale doctrine in any meaningful way.225 
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3.  New Media, New Battles Between Access and Control, and the 
Legislative-Judicial Divide:  Betamax and the Record Rental Amendment 
During the first seventy-five years after the codification of the first sale 
doctrine, media consumption remained relatively static.  Television 
broadcasted programs and theaters showed movies,226 radio played music 
and people listened to audio recordings on vinyl records,227 and people read 
paperback and hardcover books.228 
In fact, despite the introduction of the audiocassette in the 1960s, home 
taping did not become popular until the late 1970s.  At that time, cassette 
quality increased, Sony released its portable cassette player (the Walkman), 
and automobile sound systems converted from 8-track tape (a playback-
only medium) to audiocassette.229  Also around this time, the videocassette 
recorder, like Sony’s Betamax and JVC’s VHS, became affordable for the 
average customer.230 
As access to these media and technology grew, so did the potential for 
piracy and concern over copyright holders’ inadequate control.  In June 
1980, the first commercial record rental operation opened in Japan.231  In 
September 1981, the first U.S. rental record shop, Rent-A-Record, opened 
in Providence, Rhode Island.232  These shops spread quickly with more than 
250 opening in the United States by April 1983.233  Often, the rental record 
shops provided blank audiocassette tapes at deep discounts or even free 
with record rentals.234  In Japan, the Japan Phonograph Record Association 
blamed the proliferation of record rental shops for the first drop in record 
sales in twenty-five years.235 
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Also in 1983, the music industry braced for what was then heralded as 
“the biggest phenomenon . . . since stereo was introduced”:  the compact 
disc.236  At the time, music industry commentators viewed the compact disc 
to be “virtually indestructible.  Scratch them, walk on them, play them as 
many times as you like and they lose none of their quality.”237 
In response to these burgeoning developments, the Copyright Act of 
1976 seemingly offered no protection for the copyright holder.  Section 106 
granted the copyright holder the exclusive right of reproduction and 
distribution.238  However, the first sale doctrine limited § 106:  “‘the owner 
of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title . . . is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise 
dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.’”239  Under this 
statutory provision, the copyright holder could prevent a record rental store 
from actively making copies, but it could not prevent a record rental store 
from simply renting records while consumers made copies privately.240 
As a result, Congress passed the Record Rental Amendment of 1984.241  
This amendment added a new subsection to the codification of the first sale 
doctrine, 17 U.S.C. § 109(b), excepting commercial “rental, lease, or 
lending” from the rights of a phonorecord owner under the first sale 
doctrine.242 
In 1992, Congress passed similar legislation entitled the Audio Home 
Recording Act243 (AHRA) in response to another new technology:  digital 
audiotape (DAT). This legislation broadly defines a “digital audio copied 
recording” to include “a reproduction in a digital recording format of a 
digital musical recording, whether that reproduction is made directly from 
another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission.”244  In 
addition, the AHRA permitted limited copying through the use of a Serial 
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Copying Management System.245  The Serial Copying Management System 
permits copying from a legally purchased copy (i.e., first generation 
copying), but not from copies made from the legally purchased copy (i.e., 
second generation copying).246  However, subsequent interpretation has 
limited the scope of AHRA to DAT format.247 
While Congress considered how to balance public access with copyright 
holder control in audiocassettes, the judiciary tackled the same problem in 
videocassettes.248  This judicial review culminated in Sony Corp. of 
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. (Betamax).249 
In Betamax, Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions sought to 
hold Sony liable for copyright infringement because “some individuals had 
used Betamax video tape recorders . . . to record some of [Universal and 
Walt Disney]’s copyrighted works which had been exhibited on 
commercially sponsored television.”250  Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the 
opinion of the Court, from which four justices dissented.251 
The Betamax Court found that the evidence supported the idea that the 
majority of VCR users utilized the recording technology for time-shifting 
purposes (i.e., users would record a program in order to view it once at a 
different time).252  When considering whether this use infringed on 
Universal and Walt Disney’s copyrights, the Court stated it “must be 
circumspect in construing the scope of rights created by a legislative 
enactment which never contemplated such a calculus of interests.”253  In so 
doing, it focused on “[t]he sole interest of the United States and the primary 
object in conferring the [limited copyright] monopoly,” which it identified 
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as “the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.”254  
With these principles in mind, the Court determined that private, time-
shifting use of VCR technology constituted fair use under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 107.255 
Although Betamax does not expressly implicate the first sale doctrine, its 
contemporaneity undoubtedly influenced the scope of the rental right.256  
Perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Betamax likely excluded 
motion pictures from the Record Rental Amendment.257  However, it is 
important to note that the underlying technology involved in Betamax and 
the Rental Amendment are different in two significant respects:  (1) the 
quality of the resultant copy; and (2) the costs associated with making that 
copy.258  Music and software copying allow for pristine, near perfect 
replication at relatively small cost.259  By contrast, televised motion pictures 
include commercial interruptions.260  Even with the ability to pause a 
recording during commercial breaks, or fast-forward past commercials, 
some motion picture content may be edited for televised broadcast.261 
Because the copyright holder’s “private motivation must ultimately serve 
the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the 
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other arts,”262 the resulting effects on how these works are made available 
to the public may influence whether one believes a content-based solution 
(Betamax), a legislative solution (the Record Rental Amendment), or some 
combination most effectively achieves these goals. 
C.  The Evolution of Copyright Law into the Digital Domain 
In 2001, the U.S. Copyright Office concisely identified the difference 
between physical and digital copies:  “Physical copies of works degrade 
with time and use, making used copies less desirable than new ones.  
Digital information does not degrade, and can be reproduced perfectly on a 
recipient’s computer.”263  Despite this distinction, the development of 
digital property followed a very similar path to that of physical property 
from Caxton’s introduction of the printing press through Bobbs-Merrill 
Co.264  But, in 1998, when Congress faced the first sale question in regard 
to digital property, it decided to wait to address the issue.265 
1.  The Distinctly Physical Origin of Digital Property 
While working on the 1880 U.S. Census, twenty-year old engineer 
Herman Hollerith became interested in automating the process of tabulating 
data.266  By 1889, Hollerith invented technology consisting of punch cards 
and readers to tally results.  With this technology, Hollerith won a contract 
to tabulate the 1890 Census.267 
Instead of selling the equipment to the U.S. Census Bureau, Hollerith 
chose to lease it.268  The technology proved successful, finishing in two and 
a half years a tally that previously took seven years to complete.269  
Hollerith’s technology performed other countries’ censuses and large firms’ 
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payroll, inventory, and billing.270  Hollerith continued to rent rather than 
sell the equipment.271  Like London’s Royal Stationers’ Company of the 
fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,272 Hollerith’s choice to lease gave him 
control over the ongoing computing processes of his clients.273 
By the 1960s, the company, now called International Business Machines 
(IBM), dominated the business computing industry.274  IBM’s computers 
were general processing units, meaning that they could easily be repurposed 
with new software to perform other tasks.275  However, as a result of IBM’s 
licensing system, no third-party software industry existed.276  Instead, IBM 
sold its hardware and software bundled together as part of a “convenient 
one-stop-shopping approach to business computing.”277 
In 1969, under threat of an antitrust suit from its competitors, IBM 
unbundled its hardware from its software.278  After the unbundling, the 
personal computer gained popularity.279  In 1977, Apple introduced the 
Apple II Personal Computer.280  Unlike IBM’s customized machines, the 
Apple II was a blank slate.281  Owners could program the machines 
themselves or, more commonly, could load software written and then 
shared or sold by programmers.282 
In 1979, Software Arts released VisiCalc, the first digital spreadsheet 
software.283  VisiCalc sales were significant enough that many dealers 
started to bundle the Apple II with VisiCalc.284  VisiCalc’s success helped 
vault Apple’s sales into the tens of thousands simply because businesses 
wanted to use the digital spreadsheet.285  By 1983, IBM and another 
software developer, Lotus, caught up and surpassed the Apple II and 
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VisiCalc with their own personal computer and spreadsheet software, Lotus 
1-2-3.286 
2.  The Physical Response to the First Digital Problem of Balancing Public 
Access and Control for Creator Incentive 
Personal computers opened the previously complex and technical world 
of computing to the masses through their ability to easily perform a 
multitude of tasks by the simple loading of software.287  But one possible 
drawback of the software revolution for copyright holders was that software 
could be easily copied from the disc that stored it to an arguably infinite 
number of computers without quality loss.288  Much like the renting of 
records,289 software copyright holders feared the implications of software 
rental.290  In response, Congress enacted a similar first sale doctrine 
exception just six years after the Record Rental Amendment:  The 
Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990.291 
3.  Digital Property Access Problems Shed Their Physical Frame 
While the Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990 may 
have helped curtail the physical lending of discs containing software, the 
amendment passed at a time when the internet was still in its infancy.  As 
early as 1983, a home computer owner with a telephone line and a 
subscription to a network like CompuServe, The Source, America Online, 
Prodigy, Genie, or MCI Mail could access an Associated Press news feed, 
message on bulletin boards, play basic multiplayer games, and send private 
email to subscribers of the same network.292  But much like Hollerith’s 
IBM,293 these systems were proprietary.294 
Just like the Apple II, the development of the internet functionally 
replaced the host of proprietary network providers.295  The beginning of the 
internet is traced to a message sent from UCLA to Stanford by computers 
hooked up to Interface Message Processors on October 29, 1969.296 
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The internet began as governmental research in computer networks.297  
By the early 1990s, however, the government began to shift control of the 
internet to the private sector.298  By 1997, the internet became “remarkably 
decentralized and uninstitutionalized.”299  Also in the mid-1990s, Peter 
Tattam developed Trumpet Winsock, a program that allowed personal 
computers running Microsoft’s Windows operating system to connect to the 
internet through dial-up internet service providers.300  Trumpet Winsock 
proved to be extremely successful and Microsoft bundled it with late 
versions of Windows 95.301  The internet soon became a network that no 
particular person owned and anyone could join.302  In 1990, less than 1 
percent of Americans used the internet.303  By 1999, over 35 percent of 
Americans were internet users.304  The Computer Industry Almanac 
estimated this percentage to equate to 110,825,000 American internet users 
in 1999.305 
As the number of internet users increased, so did the information and 
technology these users accessed and transferred.  Perhaps the most notable 
technological improvement during this time was the MP3 technology306 
released in 1995.307  MP3 technology is capable of encoding digital audio 
files at a size practical for internet transmission and computer storage.308  
Prior to the invention of MP3 technology, digital recording of a song 
required forty megabytes of space.309  By comparison, an MP3 version 
needed only 3.5 megabytes.310  With the internet connection technology 
available at the time, this reduction in required space meant files that 
previously required two hours to download could instead be downloaded in 
ten minutes.311  In addition, because an MP3 is a digital file, it does not 
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degrade over time.312  While using most compression technology will result 
in original quality loss in the file, MP3 technology manipulated 
psychoacoustic principles to make this quality loss generally 
imperceptible.313  When a user copies a digital sound file like the MP3, 
there is no quality loss because the computer simply copies the numbers 
that make up the file and represent the sound sample.314 
Quickly, the MP3 made it convenient and popular to transmit 
“containerless files via the Internet, followed by storage on home 
computers.”315  Two groups enthusiastically embraced this method:  
musicians without recording contracts who benefited from the free publicity 
and high school and college students who discovered they could obtain 
MP3 copies of songs by most of their favorite musicians for free.316 
4.  The Attempt To Regain Control:  A Digital Stationers’ Company? 
In December 1996, delegates from more than 150 countries met to 
negotiate the Copyright Treaty and the Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty under the guidance of the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO).317  In July 1997, President William J. Clinton submitted the 
treaties for ratification by the Senate and proposed implementing legislation 
to Congress.318 
What began as a modest implementation effort “became a far more 
comprehensive legislative project” and eventually “the most substantial 
revision of the nation’s copyright law since . . . 1976.”319  In discussing 
what would become the DMCA, the House Committee on Commerce 
summarized its view on the new technology in no uncertain terms:  “Much 
like the agricultural and industrial revolutions that preceded it, the digital 
revolution has unleashed a wave of economic prosperity and job growth.  
Today, . . . our telecommunications industry is developing new means of 
distributing information to . . . consumers in every part of the globe.”320 
The DMCA addresses a number of copyright infringement concerns that 
are beyond the scope of this Note.321  However, the DMCA consciously 
avoided one concern:  the effects of the internet on the first sale doctrine.322 
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As early as 1995, the effects of the internet on the distribution rights of 
copyright holders and property owners were apparent.323  At this time, the 
Information Infrastructure Task Force, established by President Clinton, 
determined that the first sale doctrine did not protect internet users who 
wished to distribute digital copies.324  The task force reasoned that, in order 
to transmit a copy, computer technology required that an additional copy be 
made.325  That is, when an internet user attempts to transmit his digital copy 
to another user, “the transmitter retains the original copy of the work while 
the recipient of the transmission obtains a reproduction of the original copy 
(i.e., a new copy), rather than the copy owned by the transmitter.”326  Due 
to this required reproduction, the transmission infringes the copyright 
holder’s sole right to reproduction.327  As a result, the internet user would 
not be protected under the first sale doctrine because he would not be 
distributing his copy, but rather an unauthorized copy created by his 
computer.328 
This incidental copying is not exclusive to digital transmission.329  In 
fact, whenever a computer program or file is loaded “from a storage 
medium (hard disk, floppy disk, or [CD-ROM]) into the memory of a 
central processing unit (“CPU”)” a copy is made.330  Further, “[s]treaming 
necessarily involves a making of a number of copies of [the medium]—or 
portions of the [medium]—along the transmission path to accomplish the 
delivery of the work.”331 
There is a persuasive argument that these copies are not sufficiently 
“fixed”332 to meet the definition of “copy”333 under the Copyright Act.334  
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However, this argument has not prevailed.335  In light of this technological 
reality, Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. §§ 117 and 512.  But, by their terms, 
these provisions only provide protection in very narrow circumstances.336  
Section 117 requires that the copy either be made “as an essential step in the 
utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that 
it is used in no other manner”337 or as an archival copy “for purposes only 
of maintenance or repair of [a particular] machine.”338  Section 512 applies 
only to “service provider[s].”339 
Considering these limitations, when Congress enacted the DMCA, it 
required the Register of Copyrights and the Assistant Secretary for 
Communications and Information of the Department of Commerce to 
jointly evaluate the effects of amendments made by DMCA, “the 
development of electronic commerce and associated technology,” and “the 
relationship between existing and emergent technology” with the first sale 
doctrine in a report no later than two years after DMCA’s enactment.340 
II.  PROBLEMS OF POLICY AND PROBLEMS OF SOLUTION:  WHAT ARE THE 
RIGHT REASONS FOR THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE IN PHYSICAL PROPERTY?  
SHOULD DIGITAL PROPERTY SUPPORT AN ANALOGUE?  AND CAN IT? 
The dispute over expanding the first sale doctrine to encompass digital 
property can be viewed in two ways.  First, conflict exists over the policies 
that support or should be thought to support the first sale doctrine.  In light 
of this conflict, Part II.A.1 examines the policies behind the decision in 
Bobbs-Merrill Co.  Next, Part II.A.2 analyzes the policies supporting the 
first sale doctrine identified by the U.S. Copyright Office in its DMCA-
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mandated report and highlight the distinctions between these policies and 
those identified by scholars. 
In addition to the policy conflict, there is a dispute over whether a digital 
first sale doctrine is even possible and, if so, what the best method is to 
implement it.  In light of this dispute, Part II.B queries whether the first sale 
doctrine can be expanded to encompass digital property by exploring the 
technologies considered by the U.S. Copyright Office and those 
technologies developed after the report. 
A.  What Are the Right Reasons for the First Sale Doctrine in Physical 
Property?  And Should Digital Property Support an Analogue? 
The access-derived policies promoted by the first sale doctrine341 are the 
products of scholarship and reflection developed after more than a century 
of experience living with the first sale doctrine.  Regardless of the merits of 
these policies, the Bobbs-Merrill Co. Court saw its task in much simpler 
terms. 
1.  The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Reasoning:  Interpreting the Statute Not To 
Infringe the Right to Alienation 
The Bobbs-Merrill Co. decision is simply one of statutory 
interpretation.342  When the Court needed to determine whether Macy’s 
could resell The Castaway below Bobbs-Merrill’s set price, it returned to 
the precise language of §§ 4952, 4965, and 4970 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States.343  In construing the definition of “vend,” the Court 
looked to the statute’s “main purpose,” which it identified as “secur[ing] the 
right of multiplying copies of the work.”344  The Court determined this 
purpose by reference to its own precedent345 and the Act’s title, “An act for 
the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and 
books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, during the times 
therein mentioned.”346  In light of this purpose, the natural meaning of vend 
could not be read to infringe upon a lawful purchaser’s right to 
subsequently alienate the copy he purchased, by qualifying the title of the 
purchaser.347 
As a result, the first sale doctrine is founded upon the conventional and 
deep-rooted understanding of physical personal property ownership.348  Just 
 
 341. See supra Part I.A. 
 342. See Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 349–50 (1908) (“What does the 
statute mean in granting ‘the sole right of vending the same’? . . .  [T]his is purely a question 
of statutory construction.”). 
 343. Id. at 348. 
 344. See id. at 350–51. 
 345. See id. at 346–47 (citing Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) and 
Stephens v. Cady, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 528 (1852)). 
 346. See id. at 347 (quoting Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124). 
 347. See id. at 351. 
 348. See Liu, supra note 40, at 1302. 
 2013] CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT 1999 
like the purchaser of a radio or microwave can use it as often as she wishes, 
loan it to a friend, or sell it to another person, so can the purchaser of a 
lawfully created copy of a physical creative work.349  This view 
contemplates copyright law as a statutory creature developed in a legal 
environment where the physical property ownership rights previously 
existed.350 
2.  The U.S. Copyright Office’s Report:  The Physicality of the Copy 
When the Copyright Office published the DMCA-mandated report, it 
recommended no change to the Copyright Act.351  In part, the Copyright 
Office’s recommendation arose from its view of the policies supporting the 
first sale doctrine.352 
Specifically, the Copyright Office expressed its view that the tangible 
nature of the copy is not a “mere relic,” but rather a “defining element” of 
the first sale doctrine.353  The Copyright Office viewed the physicality of 
property to be the defining element because Bobbs-Merrill Co. focused on 
the distinction between copyright ownership (i.e., the ownership of 
intangible intellectual property) and copy ownership (i.e., the ownership of 
tangible personal property).354  Keeping this distinction in mind, the 
Copyright Office characterized the copyright owner’s distribution right (i.e., 
the right to “vend”) as a limit on the alienation right.355  Following through 
on this concept, the Copyright Office concluded that the first sale doctrine 
cabins the distribution right’s encroachment on the right to alienation.356 
In support of its view, the Copyright Office offered the legislative history 
of the 1909 Copyright Act.357  The Office conceded the brevity of the 
legislative history regarding the first sale doctrine, but stated that 
“[r]epeatedly, the congressional reports refer to the ability of the owner of a 
material copy to dispose of that copy as he sees fit.”358  In addition, the 
Office asserted that because the 1909 Act combined the first sale doctrine 
and the distinction between copyright ownership and physical copy 
ownership in the same section, it “demonstrate[d] that the concepts are two 
sides of the same coin.”359 
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By contrast, the Office observed that transfer of a digital copy does not 
require physical alienation.360  Instead, picking up where the Information 
Infrastructure Task Force left off,361 digital transmission implicates the 
“central copyright right” of reproduction.362  In this respect, the Office 
claimed that a simple transformation of the first sale doctrine to cover 
digital transmissions would not adequately address the balance of public 
access and control for creator incentive because the concerns that produced 
the first sale doctrine do not apply to digital transfer.363 
In summarizing its view of the policy supporting the first sale doctrine, 
the Copyright Office concluded by refuting public comments it received in 
support of digital first sale expansion.364  The Copyright Office’s report 
identified three specific arguments that commenters made under the broad 
assertion that a digital first sale doctrine furthers § 109’s purposes:  (1) the 
first sale doctrine results from a calculation of incentives to create; (2) the 
first sale doctrine’s purpose is promoting progress of the arts; and (3) the 
first sale doctrine is based on a right of access.365 
The Copyright Office quickly refuted the “incentive calculation” 
argument because this argument was not present in the first sale doctrine’s 
1909 legislative history.366  Even further, the Office claimed that digital 
first sale restrictions could harm the market and increase infringement so 
that the incentive to create declines.367 
Similarly, the Office disposed of the argument that the first sale 
doctrine’s purpose is to promote the progress of the arts because this is the 
policy underlying the “entire Copyright Act.”368  Without further 
explanation, the Office asserted that a more precise purpose exists for the 
first sale doctrine.369 
The Copyright Office dedicated more time to the final argument that the 
first sale doctrine is a proxy for the right of access.370  However, the Office 
attributed this argument to the “library associations” and characterized the 
argument to state that the scope of the conveyed interest should be the 
determinative factor for § 109.371  In other words, the Office viewed the 
right of access argument to state that libraries should be permitted to lend 
copies regardless of their physical or digital form because libraries do not 
 
 360. See id. 
 361. See supra notes 323–28 and accompanying text. 
 362. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at 87. 
 363. See id. at 87–88. 
 364. See id. at 88–91. 
 365. See id. at 88–89. 
 366. See id. at 88. 
 367. See id. 
 368. See id. at 88–89. 
 369. See id. at 89.  One may be able to deduce that the “more precise purpose[]” is the 
right to alienate physical copies. See id. at 87 (“Digital transmission . . . does not implicate 
the aliena[tion] of a physical artifact.”). 
 370. See id. at 89. 
 371. See id. 
 2013] CODE-IFYING COPYRIGHT 2001 
transfer ownership of title in the copy.372  Finally, the Office concluded that 
the simple fact that the first sale doctrine results in positive benefits is not 
the same as stating those benefits represent Congress’s purpose in enacting 
the first sale doctrine.373 
B.  Can Digital Property Support an Analogue to the First Sale Doctrine? 
There are a number of proposed solutions to the problem of digital first 
sale doctrine.  In characterizing these various solutions, it is helpful to think 
of them in terms of what Professor Lawrence Lessig called “modalities of 
regulation.”374  Professor Lessig identified four modes of regulation 
including (1) the law; (2) social norms; (3) the market; and 
(4) architecture.375 
First, the law regulates, in one fashion, by dictating acceptable behavior 
and punishing those who choose to disobey.376  Second, social norms 
function in a matter similar to the law, but social norms are 
decentralized.377  Communities, rather than governments, dictate acceptable 
behavior and punish those who choose to disobey.378  Third, markets 
regulate by price.379  The more expensive it is to accomplish a desired task, 
the greater the limit one may encounter in completing that task.380  Finally, 
architecture, or the way something is made, regulates as well.381  The 
examples provided by Professor Lessig include how a highway that divides 
two neighborhoods can limit the amount of integration between the 
residents in each neighborhood.382  By contrast, an easily accessible town 
square with diverse shops can increase integration between town 
residents.383 
These categories are not mutually exclusive.384  Instead, Professor Lessig 
asserts, “A policy trades off among these four regulatory tools.  It selects its 
tool depending upon what works best.”385  For digital property, all four 
modalities are in play.386  The current solutions for a digital first sale 
doctrine can be grouped in three of these modalities:  architecture, law, and 
market. 
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1.  Architecture 
At the time of the U.S. Copyright’s DMCA-mandated report and after, 
scholars proposed the idea of “forward and delete” technology as an 
appropriate, structural, digital analogue to the first sale doctrine.387  Under a 
forward-and-delete regime, the original purchaser of a copy would transmit 
her copy to another user by generating a copy on that user’s computer.388  
However, the original purchaser’s copy would be simultaneously deleted 
from her computer.389  Thus, the net result of forward-and-delete 
technology is one file, despite the reality of two copies.390  Arguably, such 
technology “is the legal equivalent of giving, lending, or selling a material 
copy in a fixed form.”391 
In 2003, Representative Zoe Lofgren of California introduced a bill 
entitled the Benefit Authors without Limiting Advancement or Net 
Consumer Expectations (BALANCE) Act of 2003.392  The BALANCE Act 
embraced forward-and-delete technology,393 but never reported out of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary.394 
More recently, companies like ReDigi, Inc. have implemented versions 
of forward-and-delete technology.395  Despite claiming protection under the 
first sale doctrine,396 copyright holders have already commenced 
proceedings against ReDigi.397  At the time of this Note, large questions 
 
 387. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 263, at x–xi; see also, e.g., Justin Graham, 
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10; Adam W. Sikich, Buyer Beware:  The Threat to the First Sale Doctrine in the Digital 
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remain over the effectiveness of forward-and-delete technology like 
ReDigi.398 
2.  Law 
If one were to accept the feasibility of forward-and-delete technology, 
most commentators agree that simultaneous legislation is necessary.  For 
example, the BALANCE Act would have amended § 109 to allow a copy 
owner to transmit a copy to a single recipient as long as the transferor did 
not retain her copy.399   
Other commentators have suggested similar amendments.400  Still others 
have sought similar access results from changes to other areas of the 
Copyright Act401 or judicial interpretation.402  For example, Representative 
Rick Boucher of Virginia introduced the Digital Media Consumers’ Rights 
Act of 2003,403 which would have permitted circumvention of technological 
measures that prevent copying as a fair use exception when the 
circumvention did not infringe the copyright.404  However, like the 
BALANCE Act, this bill died in committee.405  Perhaps a more extreme 
example—one that seeks copyright overhaul more generally—can be found 
 
 398. See, e.g., Torie Bosch, Court Refuses Music Company Request To Shutter Site 
Selling “Used MP3s”—For Now, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2012, 5:20 PM), http://www.slate.com/
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Executive Officer, John Ossenmacher, has said that “there’s no way for ReDigi to guarantee 
that users who resell music through his service haven’t made copies of their songs and stored 
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L. REV. 91, 127–37 (2010) (suggesting a regulatory oversight regime designed to protect and 
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2272–73 (2004) (advocating a property-rule approach, rather than a tort-rule approach, to 
access of digital property because a tort-rule approach will encourage technical measures 
that are less flexible than legal measures). 
 403. H.R. 107, 108th Cong. (2003).  Boucher introduced a similar bill in 2005 that also 
died in committee. See Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005, H.R. 1201, 109th 
Cong. (2005); H.R. 1201 (109th):  Digital Media Consumers’ Rights Act of 2005, 
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n.189 (2010). 
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in Professor Tom W. Bell’s argument for return to the original Copyright 
Act of 1790.406 
3.  Market 
In the DMCA-mandated report, the Copyright Office rejected expansion 
of the first sale doctrine for digital property because “analogy to circulation 
of goods in the physical realm . . . [is not] compelling for several 
reasons.”407  Instead, it chose a “wait and see” approach.408 
First, because digital copies do not degrade over time,409 they are no less 
desirable than the original digital file.410  In addition, the traditional barriers 
to piracy in the tangible world—“time, space, effort, and cost”—are 
eliminated by digital technology.411  For example, in Betamax,412 Universal 
Studios and Walt Disney proffered the testimony of William Griffiths to 
demonstrate how a consumer would use a VCR.413  Griffiths testified that 
he intended both to time-shift, and “to build a library of cassettes.”414  
However, Griffiths found it too expensive to maintain a library.415  He 
began to erase and reuse the tapes.416  By contrast, digital copies can be 
transmitted rapidly with little effort or cost and require only sufficient 
computer memory to store.417 
In addition to this structural difference between physical and digital 
property, the Office identified the difference in transfer. 418  The Copyright 
Office observed that the analogy comparing transfer of digital copies to the 
circulation of goods in the physical realm ultimately rested on a concept 
requiring forward-and-delete technology.419  The Copyright Office asserted 
that forward-and-delete technology was unworkable as of the time of the 
report.420 
The U.S. Copyright Office believed voluntary deletion to be an “open 
invitation” for users to engage in undetectable infringement.421  In addition, 
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the evidentiary burden of establishing simultaneous deletion would be 
impossible for either the copyright owner or the alleged infringer.422 
Similarly, the U.S. Copyright Office claimed that automatic forward-and-
delete technology is not workable for two reasons.423  First, the technology 
did not exist at the time of the report.424  Assuming the technology became 
available in the future, the Copyright Office explained that it could only 
work if it was “robust, persistent, and fairly easy to use.”425  Robust, 
persistent, and easily employed technology is expensive—an expense borne 
either by the copyright owner or the consumer.426  In both cases, there is 
little incentive to utilize such technology.427  In fact, the Copyright Office 
observed that there exists no consumer desire for products that function 
under the forward-and-delete model.428  In fact, peer-to-peer file sharing 
networks like Napster suggest that consumers “wish to retain, not destroy, 
the digital copy from which the work is transmitted.”429 
In summarizing its distaste for either the voluntary or automatic forward-
and-delete technology, the Copyright Office asserted that expansion of the 
first sale doctrine ultimately encourages infringement of the reproduction 
right through either mistaken belief or a bad faith affirmative defense.430 
By contrast, the Copyright Office asserted that Congress’s past behavior 
demonstrates a desire to protect the reproduction right at the expense of the 
first sale doctrine.431  In implementing the rental amendments,432 the Office 
explained that Congress acted on anecdotal evidence of piracy combined 
with conditions creating the potential for widespread abuse to restrict the 
public’s right to alienation in favor of the copyright owner’s exclusive right 
to reproduction.433  Here, the Copyright Office asserted that the same 
conditions apply.434  As a result, expanding the first sale doctrine to digital 
copies would similarly harm the market.435 
In part due to the Copyright Office’s reluctance to recommend action, the 
market has developed a licensing framework.436  Despite the issues facing 
companies like Netflix, Pandora, and Spotify,437 not all commentators view 
a licensing framework to be harmful.438  Professor Reuvan Ashtar proposes 
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that a licensing framework is workable because not all licensing agreements 
qualify for protection under the Copyright Act.439  By distinguishing those 
licenses that are eligible for protection from those that are not, Professor 
Ashtar suggests that a licensing framework could restore the public access 
and control for creator incentive balance.440  Similarly, others suggest that a 
licensing framework could restore this balance if it is applied primarily to 
digital goods, limited to the licensing of works protected by copyright, and 
if the license’s terms are fully disclosed to consumers.441 
C.  A Possible Response:  Fighting New Technology with 
Newer Technology 
On November 17, 2011, IBM filed an application to patent an “Aging 
File System.”442  This patent application described “[a] method, 
programmed medium and system . . . that provides for the aging of 
information and files stored thereon.  Digital data stored on the aging file 
systems ages appropriately as would normal paper or photographs without 
the need for an external application.”443  IBM’s aging file system uses 
various parameters including, for example, “ambient temperature, rate of 
aging, [and] simulated type of paper” that are input at the time of 
configuration.444  IBM’s patent application lists among the purposes of the 
aging file system to automatically and selectively age files for time-limited 
record retention purposes.445 
IBM’s patent application describes its method as working on either a 
single personal computer or a series of computers connected through a 
network to a server.446  In either case, the aging file system employs a code 
to receive original digital copies, determine their file type, create an aged 
file according to the file type and preset aging parameters, and replace the 
stored file and associated file metadata.447  Essentially, IBM’s patent 
application appears to describe a process that would automatically replace 
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files with their aged versions.448  The degree of aging would be based upon 
predetermined variables.449 
IBM’s aging file system may immediately serve those who want to 
preserve files for a certain period of time but wish to retain storage space by 
destroying these files once this period expires.450  Additionally, IBM’s 
aging file system may help introduce to digital property a characteristic that 
made the first sale doctrine successful in physical property:  degradation.451 
III.  AN ARCHITECTURAL SOLUTION:  INTRODUCING 
DEGRADATION INTO THE DIGITAL FILE 
In its report, the Copyright Office asserted that the tangible nature of the 
copy is not a “mere relic,” but rather a “defining element” of the first sale 
doctrine.452  This assertion is difficult to deny.  The Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
Court set forth the first sale doctrine in a post-Cady and Gladding world.453  
Under the Cady and Gladding precedent, the incorporeal copyright and 
tangible property right are separate.454  However, in the world of the Bobbs-
Merrill Co. Court, a copyright holder could only realize the value of her 
copyright by using tangible property.455 
A.  Harmonizing the Copyright Office’s Interpretation of the First Sale 
Doctrine with the Doctrine’s Historical Place in Copyright Law Generally 
For these reasons, the Copyright Office’s report is correct to focus on the 
material nature of the copy at issue in Bobbs-Merrill Co. and discussed in 
the legislative history of the 1909 Copyright Act.456  Nevertheless, limiting 
one’s interpretation of the policies supporting the first sale doctrine in this 
manner ignores not just the policies promoted by the first sale doctrine 
since its inception,457 but the more than three hundred years of history 
preceding it.458 
Given the ease of digital copying, an unbounded digital first sale doctrine 
“would be saying . . . that the exclusive right to make any given work of art 
necessarily belonged to the person who happened to become the owner of” 
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a computer.459  But failing to expand it disserves the primary goal of 
copyright law—deriving general benefits for the public from the effort of 
creators460—by limiting public access. 
Viewing the first sale doctrine in its historical context461 demonstrates 
that it is, in fact, a statement involved in the calculation of incentives to 
create.462  While this is in contrast to the Copyright Office’s report,463 it is 
true because the first sale doctrine promotes public access and thus limits 
creators’ control just like the limited monopoly created by England’s 
Statute of Anne464 and adopted in the United States.465 
Insofar as Congressional amendments to the first sale doctrine have 
narrowed its scope,466 these amendments should be viewed in context.  
With the Record Rental and Computer Software Rental Amendments, 
Congress responded to the threat of widespread piracy through the use of 
preexisting technology.467  By contrast, when given the opportunity to 
respond in a less-restrictive manner, Congress has done so.  The AHRA 
represents congressional action at the inception of new technology that did 
not infringe upon the first sale doctrine.468  Similarly, albeit implicitly, 
when the product has built-in piracy deterrents like recording broadcast 
television by VCR at issue in Betamax, Congress has not acted at all.469 
Perhaps at the time of the U.S. Copyright Office’s report, a “wait and 
see” approach was appropriate.  But now that more than a decade has 
brought with it new technology, it is time to reconsider whether expanding 
the first sale doctrine to digital property is possible. 
B.  Using Digital Property’s Characteristic Differences from 
Physical Property To Restore the Balance Between 
Public Access and Creator Incentive 
Under Professor Lessig’s classification system, the physical first sale 
doctrine is a legal solution that benefits from its architecture.470  The 
composition of physical property helps the physical first sale doctrine work.  
First, physical property degrades over time.471  This means that a purchaser 
who repeatedly alienates her copy may find it less valuable over time.  The 
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physical degradation may cause the purchaser to stop alienating her copy, or 
even further, replace her copy.  Second, due to issues of time, space, effort, 
and cost, physical property is harder to duplicate.472  As a result, the 
financial cost, time, space, and effort of making physical copies dissuades 
potential pirates.473 
Solutions offered for expanding the first sale doctrine to digital property 
have focused exclusively on replicating the second aspect of the first sale 
doctrine.474  Forward-and-delete technology seeks to remedy the harm to 
the copyright holder caused by copying by looking to the net result.475  
Statutory amendments seek to redefine and narrow what sort of copying the 
government considers harmful to the copyright holder.476  A market 
solution purports to allow the parties to define what type of copying is 
harmful.477 
Absent a cheap, robust, persistent, and user-friendly technology—the 
characteristics the U.S. Copyright Office identified as necessary for 
implementing forward-and-delete technology478—digital copies are easy to 
duplicate.479  Fighting this characteristic may be futile.480  Perhaps the 
better solution focuses on the other architectural characteristic that permits 
the physical first sale doctrine to function effectively:  degradation.481  
IBM’s aging file system technology allows for automatic aging of digital 
property based upon various parameters.482  Using the ease of digital 
copying as an element in this aging system may prove to be the most 
effective balance of public access and control for creative incentive in 
digital property currently available. 
For example, a regulatory regime that implemented an aging file system 
for digital property could use the number of times a file is copied as a 
parameter to accelerate file aging.  Because the aging file system identifies 
and replaces metadata as well, it could conceivably identify an original 
copy and all of its duplicative progeny.  As a result, the purchaser would be 
able to make a certain number of copies before perceiving degradation 
throughout all these copies.  However, the more copies created, the faster 
the digital copy would degrade.  Just like a physical copy that is loaned out 
a number of times, a digital copy duplicated frequently would degrade 
quickly across all copies. 
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The proposed solution is not without its pitfalls.  First, determining a 
reasonable number of copies before degradation would likely require 
market research and, possibly, congressional hearings. 
Second, because digital copies are created as part of an essential step in 
accessing the copy on a computer,483 consideration must be paid to 
determining whether these copies would factor in the aging parameters.  
One argument for including these copies is that private use of physical 
copies still factors into a physical copy’s degradation.  Book spines are 
bent, DVDs are scratched, and CDs are misplaced without ever changing 
hands.  One argument against including these copies is that pausing a DVD, 
putting a book down, or rewinding a CD generally does not factor in this 
degradation. 
Perhaps, a compromise would be that copies of a certain file size would 
be considered in the aging parameters.  In other words, copies of digital 
files that are the size of a normal buffer file when streaming media online 
would not count in aging parameters, but those exceeding this size would 
count.484  In addition, copies made to RAM would not count, but those 
made to other discs or from storage discs to hard drives would count.485 
Third, users may seek to evade the aging file system by implementing 
firewalls or disconnecting from the internet.  Other provisions already 
contained in the DMCA may possibly address anti-aging file system 
firewalls.486  Simply disconnecting from the internet would lead users to 
revert to physical transfer through portable drives or storage discs.  These 
transactions would likely involve the same discouraging financial cost, 
time, space, and effort of physical copying.487 
Certainly, there may be other pitfalls.  For example, like forward-and-
delete technology, the cost of implementing such a system is uncertain.  
Additionally, a statutory amendment defining a digital copy488 and 
including it in the first sale doctrine, if not necessary, would certainly be 
desirable.489  However, an aging file system better aligns digital files with 
their physical counterparts.  Even further, an aging file system uses 
copying—digital property’s strength—as a deterrent to better balance public 
access and control for creator incentive.  If Congress adopted a regime 
employing an aging file system, online streaming media companies would 
have the option of purchasing copies from private consumers or other 
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digital marketplaces.  In addition, these companies would be able to 
generate revenue beyond subscription fees and advertisements by alienating 
digital copies that may generate demand, but not justify the cost of 
perpetual storage on their servers, reminiscent of the neighborhood record 
or video store’s bargain bin. 
